


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15 March 1962


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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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15 March 1962


## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

## CONTENTS

1. USSR-Berlin: Soviet Union schedules six transport flights in southern corridor for 15 March. (*Page i*)




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7. Argentina: Comment on congressional and provincial elections of 18 March. (*Page v*)
8. Colombia: Lleras expresses "serious concern" over subversion during 18 March elections. (*Page vi*)
9. British Guiana: Independence to be delayed. (*Page vi*)
10. Thailand. (*Page vii*)
11. Watch Committee Conclusions. (*Page viii*)

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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

15 March 1962

## DAILY BRIEF

\*USSR-Berlin: Six Soviet transport flights scheduled for 15 March are to take place in the southern corridor during daylight hours. Three flights are to be made in each direction at altitudes from 5,000 to 10,000 feet between 0400 and 0535 EST. Plans for these aircraft movements were filed about 24 hours in advance.

The four Soviet transport flights which were scheduled in the northern corridor during the hours of darkness on 14 March were canceled shortly after the first two aircraft were to enter the corridor and were subsequently rescheduled for 16 March. The Soviet representative in BASC gave no reason for the cancellations; weather did not appear to be a factor.

The US Mission in Berlin reports a growing concern among the West Berlin leadership over Soviet flights in the air corridors and the Western response to these actions. The realization among the Berlin population that the full story of Soviet air corridor harassment has not been made public, the nerve-racking sporadic sonic booms made by Soviet aircraft over the city, and such incidents as the shooting of a British military driver last week have produced an atmosphere of uneasiness. Mayor Amrehn told US officials that he regarded the chaff drops as a highly dangerous threat to the safety of the corridors. [redacted]

[On the basis of findings by its Watch Committee, the United States Intelligence Board on 14 March reached the following conclusion concerning Berlin.] [redacted]



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[S] Soviet harassing and probing tactics against Allied access to Berlin will continue, especially in the air corridors. Bloc military activity suggests that the Communists do not expect their actions to provoke military confrontation in the immediate future.

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15 Mar 62

DAILY BRIEF

ii

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[REDACTED]

\*Argentina: The congressional and provincial elections on 18 March are of critical importance to the stability and economic development program of the Frondizi administration. Frondizi's bare majority in congress is at stake. The military are reported unwilling to permit candidates of the neo-Peronista parties to be installed in such posts as governor of Buenos Aires Province, which is the second most important political office in Argentina. The election in this province will be a close race among Frondizi's Intransigent Radical party (UCRI), the People's Radical party (UCRP), and the combined neo-Peronista factions. The armed forces cooperated to exert pressure on Frondizi to break relations with Cuba on 8 February, and now seem united on this issue. Foreign Minister Carcano expressed concern to Ambassador McClintock on 13 March that the military, either through bad advice or "sheer simplicity," might be tempted to overthrow the government. [REDACTED]  
(Backup, Page 3)

25X1

15 Mar 62

DAILY BRIEF

v

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Colombia: President Lleras has informed the US ambassador of his "serious concern" over possible Communist-inspired revolutionary activity after the 18 March congressional elections. He has placed the military and police on a special alert for this period. The subversive broadcasts of a clandestine radio station, which is Communist-oriented, may be part of a larger plan to create electoral unrest. In addition to the attempts to instigate revolution, the broadcasts have particularly attacked the Colombian Government's policy toward Cuba. Lleras believes that the station is supported from abroad. The Communists instigated a bus strike in Bogota on 5-6 March. They can be expected to provoke violence and exploit political animosities, not only during the forthcoming elections but also prior to the more crucial presidential elections in early May.

Although Colombian security forces and government officials have taken extensive precautions to ensure a peaceful election, the US Embassy notes a general atmosphere of uneasiness and apprehension. [REDACTED]

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British Guiana: Premier Jagan has agreed to an investigation of the 16 February riots by a British-appointed Commission of Inquiry. This will almost certainly require postponement of the constitutional conference previously planned for May, and will probably delay British Guiana's independence at least until early 1963. Britain's final decision on the timing of the conference will probably be made next week after Colonial Office Undersecretary Fraser returns from his survey trip to the colony, where the security situation remains tense. Opposition People's National Congress Leader Burnham also wants independence to be delayed because he fears further violence between East Indian and Negro elements and wants time to strengthen his party. [REDACTED]

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15 Mar 62

DAILY BRIEF

vi

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Thailand: Premier Sarit's precarious health and ambitions of his subordinates could at any time upset the political stability he has maintained since seizing power in 1957. The coup d'etat has long been the accepted means of government change in Thailand.

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Despite Sarit's efforts as early as 1960 to arrange for an eventual orderly succession, his sudden death or disability could result in a power struggle.

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15 Mar 62

DAILY BRIEF

vii

25X1



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## WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS

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[On the basis of findings by its Watch Committee, the United States Intelligence Board concludes that]

[No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends deliberately to initiate direct military action in the immediate future.]

BERLIN: [(Carried on Page ii of Daily Brief)]

SOUTH VIETNAM: [Despite vigorous government military operations, the Viet Cong continue to launch company and battalion-size attacks against lines of communications and isolated guard posts. Bloc propaganda against US assistance to South Vietnam and Communist logistical improvements in North Vietnam continue.]

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SELECTED INTELLIGENCE  
REPORTS AND ESTIMATES

(Available during the preceding week)

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[Afghanistan's international position: probable developments during the next few years, including an annex on Pushtunistan. USIB. NIE 37-62. 8pp. 7 Mar 62.]

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[Prospects for Indonesia: estimate of economic outlook and political developments for the next year, with special reference to international orientation and the West New Guinea dispute. USIB. NIE 55-62. 7 Mar 62.]

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15 Mar 62

DAILY BRIEF

viii

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### Argentine Elections

In order to retain control of the 192-man Chamber of Deputies, Frondizi's UCRI must win 50 of the 87 seats at stake; it now has 47 valid until 1964. Since the electoral system gives two thirds of the seats to the party winning a plurality and one third to the runner-up, the UCRI must place first in Buenos Aires Province, where 26 seats are being renewed, and second in the Federal Capital (Buenos Aires City), where 18 deputies are being elected. The UCRI must also win in other provinces, but its chances are better outside of Buenos Aires.

The only party in a position to compete for majority control is the UCRP, which has 40 seats assured until 1964. One half of the chamber is renewed each two years; 10 deputies for the new chamber were elected in December in Santa Fe Province, where the UCRI placed first.

All parties are angling for the Peronista vote, which could be decisive in view of the fragmentation of Argentine political parties. Peronista support aided Frondizi's landslide election in 1958, when the UCRI won complete control of congress and all provincial governments. Since then the Peronista leader has strongly opposed Frondizi. This contributed to the UCRI's losses in the March 1960 elections.

The Peronistas are split into a number of neo-Peronista parties, some of which are presenting joint slates in Buenos Aires. The Justicialista party, official successor to the outlawed Peronista party, was banned in November 1960 following Peronista attempts to promote a revolt. Conflicting orders from Peron--still in exile in Spain--have contributed to confusion among Peronista ranks.

The Peronistas--though apparently still confident--may decide at the last moment to withdraw from the race in Buenos Aires if they feel they cannot make a strong showing. If they did withdraw, they would be in a position to damage Frondizi



by supporting the UCRP, which has threatened to scuttle Frondizi's economic program if it gains control of congress. The UCRP espouses a nationalistic program, but its main emphasis is total opposition to Frondizi, regardless of issue.

Strong dissatisfaction with economic hardships under the US-backed stabilization program initiated in January 1959 was an important factor in the UCRI's losses in the 1960 elections. Frondizi publicly acknowledged that the program was unpopular but insisted that it was essential to recovery from the years of economic deterioration under Peron. He expected that by the 1962 elections, visible results would demonstrate the benefits of this decision. The program, however, has moved more slowly than he anticipated, particularly in improving conditions for the workers, who have borne the brunt of austerity. On the other hand, the program has stabilized the peso, attracted foreign investment to help offset the trade deficit--which in 1961 is estimated at \$500,000,000--and greatly expanded petroleum production.

The elections will strongly affect the application of the stabilization program over the next two years and the outcome of the presidential election in 1964. [REDACTED]

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### The Congressional Elections in Colombia

The congressional elections in Colombia will have a substantial impact on the acceptance of the presidential election results in May, and the two contests together will provide a test of the effectiveness of the National Front system of government--and possibly its survival. The National Front provides for parity between the traditional Conservative and Liberal parties in all elective and appointive offices from the national through the local level and also for alternation of the presidency between them for four consecutive terms of four years each ending in 1974. By law, only the two parties may present candidates, and Liberal President Lleras, who completes the first term in August, must be followed by a Conservative.

The Front has been subject to increasing strains, particularly during the past two years, largely because of the divisions within and between the two parties. In effect a multiparty system has developed. The factions include the antagonistic Laureanista and Ospinista Conservatives of roughly equal voting strength; the majority Liberals; and the dissident Liberal Revolutionary Movement (MRL), a Communist-influenced group which until recently has openly opposed the Front and which plans to run its own Liberal candidate despite the legal prohibition.

The Ospinistas, who won a majority of the Conservative vote in the 1960 congressional elections, have cooperated with the majority Liberals to provide the major support for the Lleras administration during the past two years. These two factions have agreed to support the Conservative presidential candidacy of Guillermo Leon Valencia.

The Laureanistas, who are opposed to the government coalition and obstructed its operation, have recently won the support of independent Conservative Jorge Leyva and his followers, and hope to win a clear majority of the Conservative vote on 18 March. Through such a victory they could assert

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the right to name a presidential candidate either independently or in cooperation with the majority Liberals. Leyva, a maverick and only opponent of Lleras in 1958, polled a significant fraction of the total vote at that time. A Laureanista victory could pose a threat to the Ospinista-Liberal coalition arrangement, wreak havoc with party alignments, and generally intensify the already deep political animosities.

The Colombian Communist party is expected to back the MRL candidates on 18 March, and to seize any opportunity to undermine the Front, provoke violence, and increase party tensions. The Communists and their allies are also revealing a growing interest in exploiting rural violence, which encompasses banditry and guerrilla warfare. The clandestine radio, which has aroused President Lleras' concern, is believed to be located in an area where such violence has been centered in recent weeks. Colombian leftists are known to have sought the support of the Cuban regime for guerrilla activity, but Cuban involvement has not yet been demonstrated. [REDACTED]

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




## Thailand

There have been periodic parliamentary elections in Thailand since the absolute monarchy was overthrown by a coup led by a group of junior military and civilian officials in 1932. These, however, were for the purpose of lending legitimacy to governing cliques which had gained power through military force. In the postwar coups of 1947, 1957, and 1958, as well as those of the prewar period and other attempts that failed, the leadership has always come from a handful of senior military officials acting directly or through a civilian figurehead.

Premier Sarit is a product of the coup system. In 1947 he was a major participant in Marshal Phibun's coup which toppled the postwar civilian government and sent its premier, Pridi, into exile in Peiping. Professing unswerving loyalty to Phibun, Sarit rose to become, as commander of the armed forces, one of the three most powerful members of the government. He launched his own coup in 1957. For a year he exercised control of the government through lesser military and civilian leaders; in 1958, he consolidated his power by assuming the premiership, with the support of the most powerful of the army's senior officers. These are the men he has watched most closely and manipulated in an effort to prevent any from accumulating enough strength to threaten him. Civilian leaders, intellectuals, and students, although they may have ambitions for political leadership, have lacked support from an apathetic peasant society and have been unable to develop any strong military backing. Thus they have been used--or suppressed--by the military leadership. The Kong Le coup in Vientiane in August 1960 came as a severe shock to the Thai leaders; since then, the Sarit government has come to fear the possibility of another junior officer revolt such as occurred in Bangkok in 1932.



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Executive Offices of the White House

Special Counsel to the President

Military Representative of the President

The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Director, Office of Emergency Planning

The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Under Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Assistant Secretary of Defense

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director, The Joint Staff

The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

The Department of Justice

The Attorney General

The Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

The Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

The National Security Agency


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